The Court of Appeals of Kentucky recently handed down its opinion in Ramsey v. Lambert, 2009 W.L. 2408413 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009), a breach of contract action that touches upon the unauthorized practice of veterinary medicine. The basic facts are as follows:
Kenneth Ramsey hired David Lambert to help him evaluate Thoroughbreds at auctions in Kentucky and Florida. Among other methods, Lambert used an ultrasound to conduct heart scans on potential horses – he would then compare the size and shape of the horse’s heart to previous race winners. This is not an uncommon practice.
The Ramsey-Lambert agreement was based on a letter, which set forth Lambert’s conditions, including:
- A prearranged fee to cover heart scans and all physical exams
- 2.5% of purchase price
- A bonus in the event a purchase wins races as follows:
- A Grade I race: $50,000
- A race of $1m or more: $50,000
- For any stallion that goes to stud: 2 breeding rights
Ramsey testified that he only agreed to the first two points. Thus, when one of the horses Lambert ID’d, Roses in May, won the Grade I Whitney Handicap in August of 2004, and Lambert sent Ramsey an invoice for $50,000, Ramsey did not pay. [Ramsey did pay Lambert $50k after Roses in May won the Dubai World Cup, but he alleged that he paid all employees that amount after the win]. After Ramsey sold Roses in May to Japanese interests for $8m, Lambert claimed he was owed 2 breeding rights under the contract, which he valued at $100,000 each. Thus, the total amount Lambert claimed under the contract was $250,000.
When Lambert sued Ramsey in Fayette Circuit Court for breach of contract, Ramsey counterclaimed that the heart scanning conducted by Lambert constituted the practice of veterinary medicine. Because Lambert was not licensed as a vet in Kentucky or Florida, Ramsey concluded that Lambert was engaging in the unauthorized practice of veterinary medicine.
The trial court found that heart scanning constituted the practice of veterinary medicine and awarded Ramsey $17,966 in damages for the heart scans performed in Kentucky (although the court noted that Ramsey still hired non-vets to perform such scans). The trial court found for Lambert on the breach of contract claim. Both parties appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that the heart scans constituted the practice of veterinary medicine. It noted that KRS 321.181(5)(a) defines the practice of veterinary medicine as follows:
to diagnose, treat, correct, change, relieve, or prevent animal disease, deformity, defect, injury, or other physical or mental conditions, including the prescription or administration of any drug, medicine, biologic, apparatus, application, anesthetic, or other therapeutic or diagnostic substance or technique, and the use of any manual or mechanical procedure for testing for pregnancy, or for correcting sterility or infertility, or to render advice or recommendation with regard to any of the above.
The court agreed with Lambert that he did not do any of the above, but rather provided opinions regarding the identification and procurement of Thoroughbreds that he believed possessed the potential to race successfully. The court found similarly under the Florida statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict in favor of Lambert on the contract claim.
This case is interesting not because of the contract claim – those are commonplace in the horse industry – and not just because the court addressed the unauthorized practice of veterinary medicine, which has received a lot of attention lately with respect to practitioners of equine dentistry or chiropractics. I also found it interesting because it leads to an examination of the structure of the vet-client-patient relationship.
KRS 321.190 prohibits the practice of medicine without a valid veterinary license. There are several exceptions, including owners, owner’s employees, and trainers, provided there is a “vet-client-patient relationship.”
KRS 321.185 sets forth the requirements for a vet-client-patient relationship:
The vet has assumed responsibility for making judgments regarding the health of the animal and the need for veterinary treatment, and the client, whether the owner or other caretaker, has agreed to follow the instructions of the veterinarian. (emphasis added)
“Client” is not defined further in Chapter 321.
If you’ve been following racing news, that highlighted section might remind you of Joe Drape’s recent New York Times article, “Lawsuit Sheds Light on Use of Legal Medications in Horses.” More specifically, it might remind you of Dr. Foster Northrop’s testimony, as recounted by Drape, in the IEAH lawsuit against David Lanzman over the purchase of I Want Revenge. When Andre Regard, counsel for IEAH, asked him who he believed was his client – the owner or the trainer – he replied:
“The trainer …. The trainer is the agent of the owners is my understanding of it, but with that said, I welcome all owners to communicate directly with me.”
It may take the sting out of Drape’s use of Northrop’s testimony, but Kentucky statutes (and agency law) support the vet’s reasoning. Moreover, although owners who watch over their stables are certainly laudable, the structure of this relationship is essential to Thoroughbred ownership, and especially essential in encouraging new ownership.
Almost 80 years ago, Adolf Berle detailed the separation of ownership and management in The Modern Corporation and Private Property. In it, he wrote:
Under the corporate system, the second function, that of having power over an enterprise, has become separated from the first. The position of the owner has been reduced to that of having a set of legal and factual interests in the enterprise while the group which we have called control, are in the position of having legal and factual powers over it. (emphasis added)
Just like executives can run amok in corporations, the separation of ownership and control of Thoroughbreds can leave the door open to over-medication or other worrisome behavior. This explains Dr. Northrop’s statement, as related by Drape, that he supports transparency and disclosure of treatments to the owners. Think of it as an anti-fraud provision in corporate law. While I understand Drape’s motives, I think it was unfair of him to juxtapose this comment with the statement that Northrop’s interest in transparency doesn’t surround disclosure to bettors, because that’s not really Northrop’s concern – he’s a vet, not a steward or a racing commissioner. He’s interested in reining in misbehavior by creating an informed owner – bridging the gap between ownership and control.
I’m not saying I have the answers; as usual, I’m just making observations.