An interesting decision was handed down by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in late December, regarding a veterinarian who sued a horse owner for payment. After reading it – and realizing I hadn’t heard of it earlier – I did a quick search and found an article on Harnesslink that fleshes out the details a little more.
The Plaintiff in Danvers v. Bilach, 2009 WL 5084947, is an equine veterinarian in New Jersey who treated a standardbred race horse, River Runs Red, owned by Darryl Thomas and trained by Rich Bilach (who was not a party to the appeal). That Danvers treated the horse, and that the treatments were necessary, was not contested.
At issue in the case was whether Thomas had authorized Danvers to perform certain vet services on the horse. Thomas claimed that he hadn’t authorized Danvers to treat the horse – and thus that he didn’t have to pay the $1866 bill. Danvers, on the other hand, claimed both that Thomas, the owner, had orally authorized him to treat the horse, and that the Bilach, thetrainer, had authorized the specific services.
The trial court actually found that there was no contract between the vet and owner, and dismissed Danvers’s case, leading to the appeal. In fact, the trial court, inexplicably, ruled that questions about the agency relationship between owner-trainer-vet were not relevant in a “basic contract case.” To whit (as related by the appellate court):
During the course of the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel attempted to question his client about the practice in the horse racing business of veterinarians dealing with trainers rather than horse owners in providing veterinary services. Defendants objected to the relevance of such questions, and the trial court asked plaintiff’s counsel the purpose of this line of questioning. In response, plaintiff’s counsel stated: “I just wanted to clarify that if the Court decided that the conversation never took place, that … an alternate theory of recovery is that the veterinarian worked with the trainer, the trainer ordered the services, he’s an agent, he has no liability, the liability falls on the owner.”
Regardless, as noted, the trial court ruled that the questions were not relevant.
The appellate court reversed, but not on the basis of the agency relationship between owner, trainer, and vet, or the fact that the agency relationship can bind a principle in contract where the agent had actual or apparent authority to contract. Instead, the appellate court found for Danvers, the vet, based on quantum meruit. Such a claim exists when one party has conferred a benefit on another party, and it would be unjust or inequitable to deny recovery to the conferring party. Here, the court found that Danvers conferred a benefit upon Thomas with a reasonable expectation of payment. Because it was uncontested that the services were necessary, Danvers was entitled to bring a claim. As such, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new trial on a quantum meruit basis. I don’t believe the new trial has been scheduled yet.
I think this case is interesting on a couple of levels.
First, I find it odd that even the appellate court didn’t focus on the agency relationship at issue here. As this issue has been in the news of late with the I Want Revenge / IEAH litigation, as detailed in a previous post. I would have loved to have seen an exploration of the extent of a trainer’s actual or apparent authority to order vet services.
Second, I’m interested in the fact that the court stressed that the vet services were necessary. What if they hadn’t been necessary? The case states that they included flu/rhino and rabies vaccines, but what if they included corticosteroid injections? What if they had included a dose of a prohibited, performance-enhancing substance?
I think if a claim were brought strictly under a quantum meruit basis, despite the fact that the court places a lot of emphasis on the fact that the services were necessary, the vet still could prevail as long as he had a reasonable expectation of payment. The case may come down to a fight over what services were “necessary.” Possibly, because quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine, a court or jury may find it was “unjust” to award payment to a vet if the treatment were illegal, like a prohibited substance. But a therapeutic treatment like a corticosteroid injection may be a closer call.
At any rate, the Danvers case is a good reminder of the scope of the owner/vet/trainer relationship and the issues that can develop when an owner delegates responsibility to a trainer.
